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AIDS: LEGAL, PUBLIC,
AND PASTORAL
IMPLICATIONS
FRANK C. MORRIS, JR., ESQ.*
The public health crises occasioned by acquired immune deficiency
syndrome ("AIDS") has created a variety of legal issues impacting all ar-
eas of society. In particular, counselors to the dioceses must be prepared
to answer AIDS questions in the context of employment, health care, ed-
ucation and the clergy. AIDS is a relatively new phenomenon to society
and thus to the courts. The case law and statutes to date have dealt with
AIDS almost exclusively with regard to the workplace and school attend-
ance. There are, of course, significant questions beyond the scope of this
Article as to the application of the current case law and statutes dis-
cussed herein to the various activities and functions of a diocese and
other Church-affiliated institutions including schools and hospitals. The
purpose of this Article, however, is to review the principal court decisions,
statutes and collateral legal issues involving AIDS primarily in the em-
ployment context, thus providing counselors to the dioceses and Church-
affiliated institutions with a legal framework within which to analyze and
formulate responses to questions about AIDS, regardless of the context.
An important caveat should be noted at the outset of this review: the
body of law that has been developed regarding AIDS issues rests almost
entirely on present medical knowledge surrounding the contagiousness of
the HIV virus and the four ways in which it is transmitted: (1) through
intimate sexual contact; (2) through abuse of IV drug devices; (3) through
transfusions; and (4) through the birthing process.' Therefore, if medical
* Frank Morris is a Senior Partner in the Labor & Employment Law Section of the Wash-
ington, D.C. office of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. and represents public, private, and non-
profit employers and institutions in labor and employment law matters, as well as in matters
of constitutional law. Mr. Morris gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Steven W. Ray,
an associate with Epstein Becker & Green, in the preparation of this Article, which is based
on Mr. Morris' presentation to the United States Catholic Conference's Twenty-fourth An-
nual Meeting of Diocesan Attorneys Association on April 26, 1988.
Guidelines issued by the federal Center for Disease Control ("CDC") have pronounced
that AIDS cannot be transmitted through "casual contact" in the workplace or elsewhere.
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opinion begins to significantly vary on the modes of transmission, the cur-
rent legal conclusions on AIDS-related issues will also change. Conse-
quently, practitioners must remain alert to developments in the medical
community about AIDS to ensure that any legal advice on AIDS issues is
based on the most current medical knowledge.
Several well-defined legal theories have been interpreted to provide
protection to AIDS victims in the employment context, each of which is
discussed below: handicap discrimination, sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, and privacy rights. Additionally, the courts have begun to grapple
with the claims of co-employees who may have safety concerns from
working with AIDS victims. Because of the conflicting considerations con-
fronting employers, the advantages and disadvantages of formulating an
AIDS policy are also discussed.
HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
Federal, state, and local laws prohibit discrimination against handi-
capped individuals in a variety of contexts. These laws primarily provide
protection against employment discrimination, although some of the laws
extend protection against discrimination in the delivery of services or
benefits of various programs.
Title V of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 obligates certain
employers not to discriminate against qualified handicapped persons.
2
Specifically, section 503 of the Act requires nonexempt federal govern-
ment contractors or subcontractors to take affirmative action to recruit
and employ qualified handicapped individuals.3 Additionally, covered em-
ployers are required to accommodate qualified handicapped applicants
and employees, unless such accommodation would cause unreasonable
hardship.4 Even broader protection beyond the employment context is
provided by section 504 of the Act, which prohibits discrimination against
any qualified handicapped person by any recipient of federal financial
assistance.5
Recent CDC guidelines, published August 21, 1987, recommend the use of "universal blood
and body fluid precautions" to minimize the risk of transmission of the AIDS virus from
patients to health care workers since medical history and examination cannot reliably iden-
tify all patients with the AIDS virus or other blood-borne pathogens. The federal Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration has announced that it will adopt these CDC guide-
lines. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 163, at A-11 (Aug. 25, 1987).
29 U.S.C. §§ 791-94 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Id. § 793.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The definition of "handicap" under the Rehabili-
tation Act includes any "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of [a] person's major life activities." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). The stat-
ute also expressly extends coverage to those not presently disabled but who have "a record
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Although AIDS is not specifically identified by the Federal Rehabili-
tation Act and most state handicap discrimination laws as a covered
handicap, most courts and agencies which have considered the issue have
concluded that AIDS is a covered handicap.' The leading decision dealing
with individuals suffering from a contagious disease is School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline.' Gene Arline was an elementary school teacher
who had been removed from the classroom by the school district because
she had tuberculosis, a highly contagious disease. In affirming the Elev-
enth Circuit's holding that the Rehabilitation Act protects those individ-
uals with chronic contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, the Supreme
Court used a three part analysis: (1) is the individual handicapped be-
cause one or more of the individual's major life functions are impaired by
the condition?; (2) does the individual have a record of impairment?; and
(3) is the individual regarded as being handicapped? Further, the Court
rejected an argument of the United States Justice Department, based on
an earlier interpretation by the Department, that an employer's fear of
contagion may serve as a legitimate basis for discharge of a handicapped
person.
While the Court found Arline to be handicapped, it also held that
once such a determination is made, an individualized inquiry must follow
to decide if a person handicapped by a contagious disease is "otherwise
of such impairment" or are "regarded as having such an impairment." Id. Regulations is-
sued to interpret section 504 define "physical impairment" as follows:
[A]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following bodily systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech.,Prgans; cardiovascular; reproduc-
tive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine ....
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1987).
* See, e.g., California-CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp. 1989); Raytheon Co. v.
California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1988); District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2512(a)(1), 1-2502(23) (1987);
Ross v. Gama Shoes, Inc., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $ 31,150 (D.C. 1980); Florida-FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West 1986); Shuttelworth v. Broward County Office of Budget & Man-
agement Policy, F.C.H.H.R. No. 85-0624, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242 (Dec. 11, 1985),
aff'd, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72 (Apr. 7, 1986); Massachusetts-Cronan v. New England
Tel. Co., 1 Indiv. Empl. Cas. (BNA) 658 (Mass. 1986); New York-N.Y. ExEc. LAW §
296(1)(a) (McKinney 1982); People v. 49 W. 12th St. Tenants' Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1983,
at 1, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1983) (preliminary injunction granted barring evic-
tion of tenant doctor who treated AIDS patients). Many state fair employment practices
agencies, for example in California, Maryland, and Massachusetts, hold that persons who
have AIDS are protected under handicap laws. Many states will also accept AIDS-related
bias complaints under their laws prohibiting handicap discrimination. See Leonard, Em-
ployment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 681, 689-96
(1985).
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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qualified" to perform his or her job.8 Among the facts to be considered
are: (1) how the disease is transmitted; (2) the duration of the risk; (3)
the potential harm to third parties; and (4) the probabilities that the dis-
ease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.' An eval-
uation must then be made whether the employer can reasonably accom-
modate the handicapped individual. The Court, however, noted a
limitation to this test by stating that: "[A] person who poses a significant
risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace
will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommoda-
tion will not eliminate that risk."'" The Court in a footnote also declined
specifically to consider the issue of whether an individual with a conta-
gious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impair-
ment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.1'
Because the Court avoided the AIDS issue, many questions remain
unanswered. Those questions include whether AIDS causes physical im-
pairment within the meaning of the Act, and whether an individual with
AIDS Related Complex ("ARC"), or who tests seropositive for the HIV
virus and is merely contagious without any physical effects is "handi-
capped." Subsequent to Arline, many lower courts and administrative
agencies have ruled that individuals who manifest symptoms of AIDS or
who have ARC are handicapped within the meaning of federal and state
laws.' 2 The courts and administrative agencies, however, are split on the
issue of whether those individuals who merely test seropositive for the
HIV virus should be considered handicapped. Nevertheless, because an
individual with the HIV virus may develop AIDS, and thus suffer from
impairment of a "major life activity," the better view is to treat an indi-
vidual testing seropositive as covered under the handicap discrimination
laws.
Several recent cases involving AIDS have been decided under the Re-
habilitation Act. In a post-Arline decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently directed a California district court to enter an injunction to
restore to the classroom a teacher with AIDS who had been removed to
an administrative position. 8 On appeal, the court ruled that (1) the
teacher was handicapped within the meaning of the Act, and (2) the
' Id. at 287.
' Id. at 288.
" Id. at 287 n.16.
" Id. at 282 n.7.
"' See, e.g., Chalk v. District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Raytheon Co. v. California
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1988).
"3 Chalk, 840 F.2d at 712.
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teacher was "otherwise qualified" because, based on the evidence
presented at trial, no risk of transmitting the disease existed. 4 Similarly,
in a pre-Arline case, a California district court held that AIDS is a handi-
cap under section 504 of the Act and granted a motion for a preliminary
injunction filed on behalf of a child with AIDS who was barred from kin-
dergarten after he bit a classmate." The school was ordered to readmit
the child to class because the court found, despite the evidence, that the
school had not demonstrated that there was a risk of transmission of the
virus by virtue of the child's presence in the classroom. 6
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
A number of jurisdictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. 7 For example, the New York City Council in 1986 passed
a "gay rights" bill prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation covering, inter alia, employment and housing.
A substantial percentage-currently at least sixty-six percent-of
persons who have AIDS or who are at risk of developing the disease are
homosexual or bisexual men. To date, less than five percent of all known
AIDS victims are heterosexual males who are intravenous drug users. Be-
cause of the high incidence of AIDS among homosexuals, employer at-
tempts to adopt a policy for requiring AIDS testing and exclusion for ser-
opositive results could be challenged as discriminatory on the basis of
sexual orientation. Such challenges would be based on the well-known
"adverse impact" theory of discrimination, i.e., that a neutral employer
14 The issue of whether the teacher was handicapped within the meaning of the Act was not
contested on appeal. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 705 n.6.
See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
'e However, if the child in Atascadero had a proclivity for biting, there would seem to be a
genuine issue as to the risk of transmission not usually present in either the school or work-
place setting. But cf. Local 1812 Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of
State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987). The American Federation court upheld a State De-
partment decision to expand its medical fitness program for all foreign service employees
seeking positions abroad to include blood testing for infection by the AIDS virus. Id. The
court found that HIV-infected personnel would be at significant risk by service at certain
posts where medical care would be unavailable or inadequate to cope with the illnesses asso-
ciated with HIV infection, ARC, or AIDS. Id.
'7 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a)(1) (1987); CAL. POLICE CODE art. 33 (West 1986)
(San Francisco). San Francisco also requires that all contracts with the city contain a non-
discrimination clause, including a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination. This re-
quirement has been upheld. See Alioto's Fish Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 120 Cal. App.
3d 594, 174 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). Public employers in
California should note that their state constitution's equal protection clause has been inter-
preted as prohibiting arbitrary bias against any identifiable class or group within society,
including homosexuals. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,
595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
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policy applicable to all employees or applicants nevertheless affects a pro-
tected group in a disproportionately harsh manner. A policy concerning
AIDS, or even contagious diseases generally, likely would affect homosex-
ual males at a significantly greater rate than it would affect others.
On the other hand, the risk of liability for sexual orientation discrim-
ination from adoption and use of a well conceived contagious disease pol-
icy seems fairly remote. A somewhat greater risk is that such a policy
might be deemed to violate handicap discrimination laws. The risk ap-
pears minimal enough, however, that employers may consider adoption of
such a policy to avoid acting arbitrarily as each problem is confronted. 8
TORT CLAIMS BY AIDS VICTIMS
Due to the sensitive nature of an individual's status as an "AIDS
victim," such information should not be disseminated without the indi-
vidual's consent or by compulsion of law. The unauthorized release of
such information can lead to suits against the disclosing party for defa-
mation and invasion of privacy. These claims frequently arise in the em-
ployment context when applicants or employees are wrongfully accused of
having AIDS or unfairly made the subject of derogatory comments re-
garding their lifestyle or job performance. It is defamation per se in most
states to accuse one falsely of having a "loathsome disease."
Whether truth would be available as a defense in a situation when an
individual has merely tested seropositive for the virus is not clear due to
the uncertainty of the medical evidence as to the probability that the in-
dividual will develop symptoms of the disease.
Issues of privacy and the confidentiality of medical records may be a
concern in dealing with the problem of a person who has AIDS or is sus-
pected of having AIDS. These issues frequently arise in the health care
and education settings. A clear delineation of applicable policy on disclos-
ure of medical records is required to prevent claims in this area.
Another tort claim which is unique to employment situations is
"wrongful discharge." A claim for wrongful discharge can arise if an em-
ployee who has AIDS but wishes to and is able to work is terminated or,
more likely, if an employee is discharged because he or she is unfairly
perceived to be a threat to co-workers. A wrongful discharge suit also
could be brought by co-workers terminated for refusing to work with an
18 Several jurisdictions have acted to provide express protection for AIDS victims. For ex-
ample, Wisconsin has given the state epidemiologists final authority to decide whether blood
screening is appropriate for employers and insurers. California prohibits employers, among
others, from testing people for exposure to AIDS without written consent, and also limits
the exposure of test results. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1989). The results
of such tests may not be used to determine suitability for employment or insurability. Id. §
199.21.
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AIDS employee. The latter should be defensible based on the medical
evidence that casual workplace contact should not provide the basis for
transmission of the virus. To lessen the likelihood of co-worker problems
leading to these claims, employers are encouraged to develop educational
programs for all employees and to develop policies for properly respond-
ing to problems that may arise because an employee develops AIDS, ARC
or tests seropositive.
ACTIONS BY Co-WORKERS
The rights of co-workers further complicate the analysis of dealing
with AIDS victims in the workplace. In certain circumstances, federal and
state labor laws and occupational safety and health laws may provide pro-
tection to employees who refuse to work with an AIDS victim.
Currently, a split of legal opinion exists whether employees who pro-
test working with an AIDS victim, or someone from whom they fear expo-
sure to the disease, are protected from employer discipline for engaging in
concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").1'
Under section 7 of the NLRA, employees may engage in protected con-
certed activities involving wages, hours, working conditions, or other mat-
ters of "mutual aid or protection."20 For example, the action of a single
individual may satisfy the statutory requirement for concerted activity
when he or she speaks or acts on behalf of others or addresses matters
covered by a collective bargaining agreement.2 Note, however, that in
certain circumstances, the NLRA may not extend to employment situa-
tions involving Church-sponsored schools or members of the clergy who
may also be employees of the Church.22
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has vacillated in the
area of concerted activity that involves matters of employee safety. It has
held that safety complaints made by one individual without any indica-
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
2 JMC Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 776 F.2d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 1985).
22 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (NLRB lacked jurisdiction over
teachers of church-operated school because of first amendment considerations arising from
teachers' "critical and unique role in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school");
Jewish Day School of Greater Wash., Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 106 (1987) (NLRB declined to as-
sert jurisdiction over schools "whose purpose and function in substantial part is the propa-
gation of a religious faith"). But cf. Hanna Boys Center, 284 N.L.R.B. 121 (1987) (NLRB
held that child care workers at Catholic residential school were entitled to unionize). The
NLRB in Hanna found that it had jurisdiction because, unlike teachers who have a " 'criti-
cal and unique role' in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school," the child care
workers were not teachers since their only involvement in religious activity was in taking the
boys to chapel, overseeing their homework (including religious studies), and seeing that
prayers were said. Id.
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tion of employee support would be protected absent any evidence that co-
workers have disavowed support.23 More recently, however, the NLRB
sought evidence of affirmative co-workers' support before it would recog-
nize an activity as concerted.2 4
Even employees engaged in concerted activity may lose that protec-
tion under certain circumstances.2" For example, an employee who en-
gages in activity in an abusive manner or who continues to raise com-
plaints long after the issues are resolved is no longer engaged in
"protected activity."2 6 It may be strongly argued that employees who en-
gage in a concerted refusal to work with an AIDS-afflicted co-worker be-
cause of a supposed risk of becoming infected are acting so unreasonably
that their concerted activity is unprotected.2"
Besides the NLRA, employees protesting matters of health and
safety may also find protection under federal and state occupational
safety and health statutes. The Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act ("OSHA") specifically prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees who exercise their rights under the Act, including the
right to protest unsafe working conditions.2"
An employee may refuse to work under OSHA if, in good faith, he or
she believes an assigned task involves an unreasonable risk of serious in-
jury or death. In order to justify a refusal to work, the employee should
have attempted previously to have the employer correct the allegedly un-
safe condition. The employee must show that his or her fear regarding the
condition is one with which the "reasonable person" would agree. Finally,
an employee may only refuse to work in the face of an allegedly hazard-
ous condition if time would not allow the use of the normal enforcement
mechanism provided under the Act.2 The burden of proof that the em-
ployer violated the nondiscrimination provision is on the government,
which would represent the employee's interests in an action under
OSHA.30
23 Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
24 Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v. Prill, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). But see
Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Board's Meyers decision).
15 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
20 Good Samaritan Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 618 (1982); Lutheran Social Serv. of Minn., Inc.,
250 N.L.R.B. 35 (1980).
27 In any event, an employer faced with a concerted refusal to work with an AIDS-infected
co-worker could hire replacements to perform the work of the protestors. Although the em-
ployer could hire replacements, if the co-workers' concerted refusal was a lawful, protected
activity the employer could not discharge or otherwise discipline the involved employees.
28 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
'9 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
20 A number of states have enacted occupational safety and health acts that are similar to"
the federal Act. For example, California prohibits discrimination against employees who
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Whether OSHA protects the AIDS victim's co-employees has yet to
be decided. The considerations noted above in connection with the NLRA
would also be applicable here. An employer thus arguably runs a risk of
violating OSHA's nondiscrimination clause if it reacts adversly to an em-
ployee's protesting the presence of AIDS victims in the workplace. The
better view, under current medical opinion that no risk of infection is
present in the normal workplace, should render the co-employee's protest
unreasonable and unprotected. However, this remains to be decided.
OSHA also requires the issuance of workplace standards designed to
prevent workplace illness or injury. At present, no workable standards
have been issued to address AIDS or other communicable diseases. An
emergency petition was filed with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("Administration") in February 1987, seeking a communi-
cable disease standard for use in the health care industry, but the Admin-
istration has not issued its own guidelines.
The Administration has recently announced several steps it will take
to protect health care workers from the dangers of blood-borne infectious
diseases such as AIDS and Hepatitis B. In addition to enforcing the CDC
guidelines, the Administration will examine work practices at target hos-
pitals and undertake an extensive educational effort aimed at health care
workers.
An employer may be able to protect itself from sanction for disciplin-
ing or discharging an employee based on current medical standards and
safety procedures. In a recent decision, the California Labor Commission
rejected a safety complaint by four nurses at San Francisco General Hos-
pital. The nurses, who worked the night shift, had asked to be allowed to
wear masks, gloves and gowns when treating AIDS patients, even though
hospital policy provided that such protective gear was not necessary in
most cases. They alleged that subsequent to their complaints regarding
the wearing of protective gear, they were discriminatorily transferred to
the day shift for developmental training. In rejecting their claims brought
under the state OSHA, the Labor Commission held that the hospital pol-
icy was consistent with the latest infection control procedures suggested
by the scientific community and the CDC, and the hospital thus could
demand employee compliance with its procedures.8 1
protest unsafe working conditions. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6310 (West 1989). Many states also
recognize the common law duty of an employer to provide a safe and healthy working envi-
ronment for their employees. Thus, it is possible that employers could be sued by employees
who contend they were exposed to AIDS on the job.
" Bernales v. City & County of San Francisco, Nos. 11-17001-1, 11-17001-2, 11-17001-3, 11-
17001-4 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Sept. 9, 1985).
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FORMULATING AN AIDS POLICY FOR THE WORKPLACE
Until more is known about AIDS, no particular course of action may
be taken by employers without some attendant risks and costs. Nonethe-
less, employers should begin to develop policies regarding the treatment
of AIDS victims in their employ and should consider taking action, first
to assess, and then to seek to minimize various risks. Of foremost impor-
tance to any employer is the education of employees with respect to AIDS
and the current state of medical knowledge concerning the disease. Prep-
aration of pamphlets regarding AIDS, handouts discussing in lay terms
pertinent medical information, and meetings or seminars may tend to al-
leviate many of the concerns that employees have. There are a number of
sources for such materials and for speakers, including state and local
health departments and various hospitals.
Flexibility, practicality and innovation are also very important in
dealing with AIDS issues. For example, depending upon the nature of a
job, it may be possible for an employee with AIDS to work at home. Such
a compromise would allow the employee to continue to be of productive
value, offset the cost of the illness to the employer, and benefit the sick
employee by reducing his or her exposure to others' illnesses.
Employers may want to consider instituting a contagious disease pol-
icy with paid leave. Such a policy should include a requirement that em-
ployees on leave due to AIDS or other possibly contagious diseases pro-
vide medical certification of their fitness to return to work, both from
their own doctors and the employer's medical advisor if requested. In par-
ticular, employers should ascertain whether the AIDS-afflicted employee
places co-workers at risk of AIDS or any of the other opportunistic dis-
eases associated with AIDS and should learn whether the AIDS victim
may be at risk of illness from exposure to co-workers.
Employers should further check with their insurance carriers to de-
termine whether their coverage extends to AIDS victims. If so, they
should maintain such coverage for their work force. If not, however, they
should consider informing applicants of this so that applicants may make
informed decisions whether to accept employment and provide for sepa-
rate coverage.
Employers should remain cognizant, however, that any affirmative
statements or written policies may be construed by a court as contractu-
ally obligating an employer to follow those policies. Thus, careful plan-
ning and drafting of any AIDS policy is necessary to avoid a situation in
which an employer is bound to follow a policy that subsequently becomes
economically or otherwise detrimental to the employer.
CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that as the medical research on AIDS
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evolves, and new information about the disease is disclosed, the rights
and obligations of AIDS victims in relation to employers, co-employees,
health care providers and educators will change. This ebb and flow of
rights and obligations is likely to continue until a cure for AIDS is discov-
ered and, consequently, will necessitate continued education of everyone
who must deal with AIDS victims and extreme flexibility to accommodate
the changing legal climate surrounding AIDS.
